Marriage of inconvenienceTwo armies, one American the other Pakistani, both performing dysfunctionally in this part of the world, need each otherEditorial
The Guardian, Saturday 14 May 2011
======================================================
If ever an opportunity presented itself for a civilian government to claw back powers it has ceded to an army whose tentacles extend into every part of life in Pakistan, yesterday was the day. The army, and its premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), were facing an unprecedented assault on their competence after the US raid on Abbottabad. Even talk show hosts, the secular mullahs of Pakistan, turned on them.
How could Osama bin Laden's presence go undetected for six years in a garrison town that is home to three regimental headquarters and a military academy? How could US helicopters grab their quarry from underneath their noses? Hours before the army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, was due to answer questions like these in a closed session of parliament, the Taliban put down a third amendment for debate: How is it the military failed to protect its own recruits, 66 of whom were among over 80 who died in two suicide bombings in Charsadda, north of Peshawar?
Asserting the primacy of civilian control over a failing military is, however, the last thing on the mind of President Asif Zardari. If his period of office has taught us anything, it is that there is a world of difference between strengthening the democratic project and strengthening a civilian government's hand, as one commentator has observed.
If the summit of the government's ambition is to see out a full term, then a chastened army becomes the ideal partner. One pretends to govern while the other pretends to protect.
The Guardian, Saturday 14 May 2011
======================================================
If ever an opportunity presented itself for a civilian government to claw back powers it has ceded to an army whose tentacles extend into every part of life in Pakistan, yesterday was the day. The army, and its premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), were facing an unprecedented assault on their competence after the US raid on Abbottabad. Even talk show hosts, the secular mullahs of Pakistan, turned on them.
How could Osama bin Laden's presence go undetected for six years in a garrison town that is home to three regimental headquarters and a military academy? How could US helicopters grab their quarry from underneath their noses? Hours before the army chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, was due to answer questions like these in a closed session of parliament, the Taliban put down a third amendment for debate: How is it the military failed to protect its own recruits, 66 of whom were among over 80 who died in two suicide bombings in Charsadda, north of Peshawar?
Asserting the primacy of civilian control over a failing military is, however, the last thing on the mind of President Asif Zardari. If his period of office has taught us anything, it is that there is a world of difference between strengthening the democratic project and strengthening a civilian government's hand, as one commentator has observed.
If the summit of the government's ambition is to see out a full term, then a chastened army becomes the ideal partner. One pretends to govern while the other pretends to protect.
But nor is that an answer either. Being the chief of Pakistan's army is a balancing act. He heads an empire that has simultaneously threatened to let the Chinese inspect the rotor parts of the stealth helicopter that crashed into Bin Laden's compound, and given the CIA access to Bin Laden's widows. Bigger trade-offs are in the works.
Gen Kayani will continue to resist US pressure to go after three groups that the ISI still consider long-term assets – Mullah Omar, the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba. To go after them would be to provoke civil war, the ISI pleads.
But the price of pleading impotence may also be high: allowing back all those CIA agents who have just been forced to leave the country, and with them more US operations on sovereign soil.
The bottom line is that Islamabad will not change its strategic posture. The irony of the US relationship with Pakistan is that it may not have to, if the military path currently being pursued in Afghanistan fails to blunt the Taliban's offensive. Two armies, one American the other Pakistani, both performing dysfunctionally in this part of the world, need each other.
The bottom line is that Islamabad will not change its strategic posture. The irony of the US relationship with Pakistan is that it may not have to, if the military path currently being pursued in Afghanistan fails to blunt the Taliban's offensive. Two armies, one American the other Pakistani, both performing dysfunctionally in this part of the world, need each other.
(Source:guardian.co.uk)
=================================================
No comments:
Post a Comment